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Abstract. Open access WiFi hotspots are widely deployed in many
public places, including restaurants, parks, coffee shops, shopping malls,
trains, airports, hotels, and libraries. While these hotspots provide an
attractive option to stay connected, they may also track user activities
and share user/device information with third-parties, through the use
of trackers in their captive portal and landing websites. In this paper,
we present a comprehensive privacy analysis of 67 unique public WiFi
hotspots located in Montreal, Canada, and shed some light on the web
tracking and data collection behaviors of these hotspots. Our study re-
veals the collection of a significant amount of privacy-sensitive personal
data through the use of social login (e.g., Facebook and Google) and
registration forms, and many instances of tracking activities, sometimes
even before the user accepts the hotspot’s privacy and terms of service
policies. Most hotspots use persistent third-party tracking cookies within
their captive portal site; these cookies can be used to follow the user’s
browsing behavior long after the user leaves the hotspots, e.g., up to
20 years. Additionally, several hotspots explicitly share (sometimes via
HTTP) the collected personal and unique device information with many
third-party tracking domains.
1 Introduction
Public WiFi hotspots are growing in popularity across the globe. Most users
frequently connect to hotspots due to their free-of-cost service, (as opposed to
mobile data connections) and ubiquity. According to a Symantec study [41]
conducted among 15,532 users across 15 global markets, 46% of participants
do not wait more than a few minutes before connecting to a WiFi network
after arriving at an airport, restaurant, shopping mall, hotel or similar locations.
Furthermore, 60% of the participants are unaware of any risks associated with
using an untrusted network, and feel their personal information is safe.
A hotspot may have a captive portal, which is usually used to communicate
the hotspot’s privacy and terms-of-service (TOS) policies, and collect personal
identification information such as name and email for future communications,
and authentication if needed (e.g., by asking the user to login to their social
media sites). Upon acceptance of the hotspot’s policy, the user is connected
to the internet and her web browser is often automatically directed to load a
landing page (usually the service provider’s webpage).
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Several past studies (e.g., [7,40]) focus on privacy leakage from browsing the
internet or using mobile apps in an open hotspot, due to the lack of encryption,
e.g., no WPA/WPA2 support at the hotspot, and the use of HTTP, as opposed
to HTTPS for connections between the user device and the web service. However,
in recent years, HTTPS adoption across web servers has increased dramatically,
mitigating privacy exposure through plain network traffic. For example, accord-
ing to the Google Transparency Report [17], as of Apr. 6, 2019, 82% of web
pages are served via HTTPS for Chrome users on Windows. On the other hand,
in the recent years, there have also been several comprehensive studies on web
tracking on regular web services and mobile apps with an emphasis on most
popular domains/services (see e.g., [14,4,3]).
In contrast to past hotspot and web privacy measurement studies, we ana-
lyze tracking behaviors and privacy leakage in WiFi captive portals and landing
pages. We design a data collection framework (CPInspector) for both Win-
dows and Android, and capture raw traffic traces from several public hotspots
(in Montreal, Canada) that require users to go through a captive portal before
allowing internet access. Challenges here include: manual collection of captive
portal data by physically visiting each hotspot; making our test environment
separate from the regular user environment so that we do not affect the user’s
browsing profiles; ensuring that our tests remain unaffected by the user’s past
browsing behaviors (e.g., saved tracking cookies); and creating and monitoring
several test accounts in popular social media or email services as some hotspots
mandate such authentication. CPInspector does not include any real user infor-
mation in the collected dataset, or leak such information to the hotspots (e.g.,
by using fake MAC addresses).
From each hotspot, we collect traffic using both Chrome and Firefox on
Windows. In addition to the default browsing mode, we also use private brows-
ing, and deploy two ad-blockers to check if such privacy-friendly environments
help against captive portal trackers—leading to a total of eight datasets for
each hotspot. We also use social logins (Facebook, LinkedIn, Google, Instagram,
Twitter) if required by the captive portal, or provided as an option; we again use
both browsers for social login tests (two to six additional datasets as we have
observed at most three social login options per hotspot). Some hotspots also
require the user to complete a registration form that collects the user’s PII—in
such cases, we collect two more datasets (from both browsers). Finally, some
hotspots collect additional personal information as part of an optional survey.
When reporting statistics on tracking domains and cookies, we accumulate the
distinct trackers as observed in all the datasets collected for a given hotspot.
On Android, we collect traffic only from the custom captive portal app (as
opposed to Chrome/Firefox on Windows) as the cookie store of this app is
separate from browsers. Consequently, tracking cookies from the Android captive
portal app cannot be used by websites loaded in a browser. Recent Android
OSes also use dynamic MAC addresses, limiting MAC address based tracking.
However, we found that cookies in the captive portal app may remain valid for
up to 20 years, allowing effective tracking by hotspot providers.
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We also design our framework to detect ad/content injection by hotspots;
however, we observed no content modification attempts by the hotspots. Fur-
thermore, we manually evaluate various privacy aspects of some hotspots, as
documented in their privacy/terms-of-service policies, and then compare the
stated policies against what happens in practice. Note: by default all our statis-
tics refer to the measurements on Windows; we explicitly mention when results
are for Android (mostly in Sec.5).
Contributions and summary of findings.
1. We collected a total of 679 datasets from the captive portal and landing
page of 80 hotspot locations between Sept. 2018 to Apr. 2019. 103 datasets
were discarded due to some errors (e.g., network failure). We analyzed over
18.5GB of collected traffic for privacy exposure and tracking, and report the
results from 67 unique hotspots (576 datasets), making this the largest such
study to characterize hotspots in terms of their privacy risks.
2. Our hotspots include cafes and restaurants, shopping malls, retail businesses,
banks, and transportation companies (bus, train and airport), some of which
are local to Montreal, but many are national and international brands. 40
hotspots (59.7%) use third-party captive portals that appear to have many
other business customers across Canada and elsewhere. Thus our results
might be applicable to a larger geographical scope.
3. 27 hotspots (40.3%) use social login or a registration page to collect personal
information (19 hotspots make this process mandatory for internet access).
Social login providers may share several privacy-sensitive PII items—e.g.,
we found that LinkedIn shares the user’s full name, email address, profile
picture, full employment history, and the current location.
4. Except three, all hotspots employ varying levels of user tracking technologies
on their captive portals and landing pages. On average, we found 7.4 third-
party tracking domains per captive portal (max: 34 domains). 40 hotspots
(59.7%) create persistent third-party tracking HTTP cookies (validity up
to 20 years); 4.2 cookies on average on each captive portal (max: 34 cook-
ies). Surprisingly, 26 hotspots (38.8%) create persistent cookies even before
getting user consent on their privacy/TOS document.
5. Several hotspots explicitly share (sometimes even without HTTPS) personal
and unique device information with many third-party domains. 40 hotspots
(59.7%) expose the user’s device MAC address; five hotspots leak PII via
HTTP, including the user’s full name, email address, phone number, address,
postal code, date of birth, and age (despite some of them claiming to use
TLS for communicating such information). Two hotspots appear to perform
cross-device tracking via Adobe Marketing Cloud Co-op [2].
6. Two hotspots (3.0%) state in their privacy policies that they explicitly link
the user’s MAC address to the collected PII, allowing long-term user track-
ing, especially for desktop OSes with fixed MAC.
7. From our Android experiments, we reveal that 9 out of 22 hotspots can ef-
fectively track Android devices even though Android uses a separate captive
portal app and randomizes MAC address as visible to the hotspot.
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2 Background and Related Work
In this section, we first provide an overview of public hotspots, and then briefly
review related previous studies on hotspots, web tracking, and ad injection.
Hotspot access is usually deployed in three forms: captive portal, direct/open-
access (no captive portals), or password-protected networks. In captive portal
networks, users first go through a captive portal session before getting inter-
net access. The captive portal web-page usually displays the privacy policy
and/or the terms-of-service (TOS) document, along with some advertisements,
and sometimes an option to select their preferred language (for viewing the portal
content), and a social login or registration form. After accepting the policy/TOS
documents, the user’s browser is often directed to a landing page, as chosen by
the hotspot owner. The captive portal is used to make sure that guests are aware
of the hotspot privacy policy, collect personal identification information such as
name and email for future communications, and authenticate guests if needed.
Several prior studies have demonstrated the possibility of eavesdropping WiFi
traffic to identify personal sensitive information in public hotspots. For exam-
ple, Cheng et al. [7] collected WiFi traffic from 20 airports in four countries,
and found that two thirds of the travelers leak private information while using
airport hotspots for web browsing and smartphone app usage. Sombatruang et
al. [40] conducted a similar study in Japan by setting up 11 experimental open
public WiFi networks. The 150 hour experiment confirmed the exposure of pri-
vate information, including photos, email addresses, confidential documents, and
users’ credentials—transmitted via HTTP. In contrast, we analyze web tracking
and privacy leakage within WiFi captive portals and landing pages. Klasnja et
al. [23] studied privacy and security awareness of WiFi users by monitoring web
traffic of 11 users. The study shows the users’ limited understanding of risks
associated with WiFi usage, and a false sense of safety.
Web tracking, a widespread phenomenon on the internet, is used for varying
purposes, including: targeted advertisements, identity checking, website analyt-
ics, and personalization. Web tracking techniques can generally be categorized
as stateful and stateless. Eckersley [11] showed that 83.6% of the Panopticlick
website [34] visitors could be uniquely identified from a fingerprint composed of
only 8 attributes. Laperdrix et al. [25] showed that AmIUnique.org can uniquely
identify 89.4% of fingerprints composed of 17 attributes, including the HTML5
canvas element and the WebGL API. In a more recent large-scale study, Go´mez-
Boix et al. [16] collected over 2 million real-world device fingerprints (composed
of 17 attributes) from a top French website; they found that only 33.6% device
fingerprints are unique, raising questions on the effectiveness of fingerprinting
in the wild. Note that developing advanced fingerprinting techniques to detect
the so-called golden image (the same software and hardware as often deployed
in large enterprises), is an active research area—see e.g., [24,38]. Several auto-
mated frameworks have also been designed for large-scale measurement of web
tracking in the wild; see e.g., FPDetective [1] and OpenWPM [14]. In this work,
we measure tracking techniques in captive portals and landing pages, and use
OpenWPM to verify the prevalence of the found trackers on popular websites.
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Previous work has also looked into ad injection in web content, see e.g., [37,43].
We use similar methods for detecting potential similar content injection in
hotspots since such incidents have been reported in the past (e.g., [45,27,35]).
3 CPInspector on Windows: Design and Data Collection
In this section, we describe CPInspector, the platform we develop for measuring
captive portal web-tracking and privacy leakages; see Fig. 1 for the Windows
variant. As Android uses a special app for captive portal, we modify CPInspector
accordingly; see Sec. 5.
The main components of CPInspector include: a browser automation frame-
work, a data migration tool and an analysis module. Our browser automation
platform, which is driven by Selenium [39], is used to visit the hotspot captive
portal and perform a wide range of measurements. It collects web traffic, HTTP
cookies, WebStorage content, fingerprints, browsing profiles, page source code,
and screen shots of rendered pages (used to verify the data collection process).
It also saves a copy of the privacy policy, if found. The datasets collected from
our evaluated hotspots are parsed and committed to a central SQLite database.
CPInspector works on Windows 7/8/10 with Firefox Quantum v60.1.0ESR and
Google Chrome v69.0.3497.100 browsers. It is developed using Selenium, Wire-
shark 2.6.2+, Node.js 8.1.1.4, WebExtensions, and Python 3.7+.
Browser
mation Data AnalysisInstrumentation
Selenium Wireshark DFPM
Ad Blockers Private Browsing
Web 
Extensions
Central 
DB
Privacy Policy
Web Tracking
Data Leakage
Output 
Datasets
Fig. 1. CPInspector components
Capturing traffic. We use Wireshark [47] to capture all traffic between the
instrumented browser and the hotspot access point. We filter out traffic gen-
erated by normal activities such as anti-virus scanning and Windows updates.
Moreover, since some captive portals adopt TLS for communication, we rely on
the SSLKEYLOGFILE [20] to decrypt the TLS traffic; we then use Tshark [46]
to extract and save the HTTP requests/responses to our database.
Identifying third-parties. We identify third-party domains using the hotspot
website’s owner. All evaluated hotspots have an official website except Hvmans
Cafe, where all domains are classified as third-parties. We primarily use the
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Python WHOIS library [36] to find domain registration information. In cases
where the domain information is protected by the WHOIS privacy policy, we visit
the domain to detect any redirect to a parent site; we then lookup the parent
site’s registration information. If this fails, we manually review the domain’s
Organization in its TLS certificate, if available. Otherwise, we try to identify
the domain owner based on its WHOIS registration email; e.g., addthis.com
is owned by Oracle as apparent from its WHOIS email domain-contact_ww_
grp@oracle.com. We also use Crunchbase [8] and Hoovers [21] to determine
if the organizations are subsidiaries or acquisitions of larger companies; e.g.,
instagram.com is owned by Instagram, which in turn is owned by Facebook.
Identifying third-party trackers. We use EasyList [10] with EasyPrivacy,
and Fanboy’s List to identify known third-party trackers. EasyList identifies
known advertising-related trackers, EasyPrivacy detects known non-advertising-
related trackers, and Fanboy’s list classifies known social media content related
trackers. These lists rely on blacklisted script names, URLs, or domains, which
may fail to detect new trackers or variations of known trackers. For this reason,
we classify third-party trackers as follows: (a) A known tracker is a third-party
that has already been identified in the above blacklists. (b) A possible tracker is
any third-party that can potentially track the user’s browsing activities but not
included in a blacklist. We observed variations of well-known trackers such as
Google Analytics, were missed by the blacklists (see Table 3 in the appendix).
Email and social login accounts. We registered 27 accounts in total to be
used in our experiments (if required by the captive portal), including: 4 Gmail,
1 Yahoo, 3 Microsoft, 8 Facebook, 4 Instagram, 6 LinkedIn, and 1 Twitter.
Ad injection detection. Our framework also includes a module to detect mod-
ifications to user traffic, e.g., for ad injections. We visit two decoy websites (i.e.,
honeysites in our control), via a home network and a public hotspot, and then
compare the differences in the retrieved content (i.e., DOM trees [13]). The use
of honeysites allows us to avoid any false positive issues due to the website’s
dynamic content (e.g., news updates, dynamic ads). However, we also include a
real website in our experiments (BBC.com). The first honysite is a static web page
while the second is comprised of dynamic content that incorporates JavaScript el-
ements, iframe tags, and four fake ads. The fake ads were created based on source
code snippets from Google Adsense [18], Google TagManager [19], Taboola [42],
and BuySellAds [6]. We host the honeysites through Amazon AWS and carefully
mimic a realistic website.
Data collection. We collected a total of 679 datasets from the captive portal
and landing page of 80 hotspots (12 hotspots are measured at multiple physi-
cal locations) between Sept. 2018 to Apr. 2019. We stopped collecting datasets
from different locations of the same chain-business as the collected datasets were
largely the same. We discarded 103 datasets due to some errors (e.g., network
failures, incomplete data collection scenarios). We analyzed over 18.5GB of col-
lected traffic for privacy exposure and tracking measurements, and report the
results from 67 unique hotspots (576 datasets). We discuss the results in Sec. 4.
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For the ad injection experiments, we collected a total of 368 datasets from
crawling the two honey websites and the BBC.com website at 98 hotspots; 11
hotspots are measured at multiple physical locations. We analyzed over 8.7GB
of collected traffic for ad injection, and report the results from 87 unique hotspots
(368 datasets). We did not observe any content modification attempts.
4 Analysis and Results for Windows
In this section, we present the results of our analysis on collected personal in-
formation, privacy leaks, web trackers, HTTP cookies, fingerprinting, and the
effectiveness of two anti-tracking extensions and private browsing mode.
4.1 Personal Information Collection, Sharing, and Leaking
PII collection. Most hotspots (40; 59.7%) allow internet access without seek-
ing any explicit personal data. The remaining 27 hotspots use social login (Face-
book, LinkedIn, Google, Instagram), or a registration page to collect significant
amount of personal information; 19 of these hotspots mandate social login or
user registration. An optional survey is also used by one hotspot. See Table 1.
The Hvmans Cafe hotspot reads the user’s profile information and media
from Instagram; the profile may include: the user’s email address, mobile phone
number, user ID, full name, gender, biography, website, and profile picture. Even
after login via Instagram, the user must also complete a form to provide her first
name, last name and email address. An option is also given to the user to choose
a password for the hotspot. However, there is no login screen to use this password
in future visits. Similarly, users must create an account at Michael Kors, where
they can use the account email/password to login in future visits. In addition,
Nespresso requires an activation code sent via SMS. Five hotspots support single
sign-on via LinkedIn (Carrefour Angrignon, Mail Champlain, Centre Rockland,
and Grevin Montreal). LinkedIn shares the user’s full name, email address, profile
picture, LinkedIn headlines, current employment, and basic profile consisting of
a large list of PII items, including full employment history, and the current
location [28].
By analyzing the used email and social login accounts, we found no activi-
ties related to the hotspots on social accounts while 5 hotspots used emails to
send promotional messages (Dynamite, GAP, Garage, Telus, and Place Mon-
treal Trust). Email is also used to activate WiFi access in YUL Airport, Telus,
Hvmans Cafe, and Montreal Science Centre.
Sharing with third-parties. Most hotspots share PII and browser/device in-
formation with third-parties via the referrer header, the request-URL, HTTP
cookie or WebStorage. We identified 40 hotspots (59.7%) that use third-party
captive portals where they share PII, including 18 (26.9%) share email address;
15 (22.4%) share user’s full name; 12 (17.9%) share profile picture; 5 (7.5%) share
birthday, current city, current employment and LinkedIn headline; see Table 1.
We also found some hotspots’ captive portals leak device/browser information
to third-parties, including 40(59.7%) leak MAC address and last visited site;
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Table 1. Personal information collected via social login, registration, or optional sur-
veys. The “Powered By” column refers to third-parties that provide hotspot services
(when used/identified). F refers to Facebook, L: LinkedIn, I: Instagram, G: Google, T:
Twitter, R: registration form, and S: survey; *: personal information is mandatory to
access the service.
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Bombay Mahal Thali* Sy5 FR FR F F
Carrefour Laval* Aislelabs FR FR FR F F F F F
Fairview Pointe-Claire* Aislelabs FR FRT FR F F F F F T T
Carrefour Angrignon Eye-In FGL FGL FGL L L L
Centre Eaton Eye-In F F F
Centre Rockland Eye-In FL FL FL L L L
Desjardins 360* JoGoGo F F F F R F F
Domino’s Pizza R
Dynamite* R
GAP R
Garage* R
Grevin Montreal Eye-In FL FL F FL L L S S L
Harvey’s* Colony Networks F FR F
Hvmans Cafe* Purple FR FR F F F F I I
Mail Champlain Eye-In FL FL FL L L L
Maison Simmon* R
Michael Kors* Purple R R R R R R
Montreal Science Centre* Telus R
Moose BAWR* Sticky WiFi R
Nautilus Plus* R
Nespresso* Orange R
Place Montreal Trust R R R
Roots* Yelp WiFi R R
Telus* R
Sushi STE-Catherine* MyWiFi R
Vua Sandwiches* Coolblue FR FR R F
YUL Airport* Datavalet FL FRL FL L L L
18 (26.9%) leak screen resolution; 26 (38.8%) leak user agent; 24 (35.8%) leak
browser Information and language; and 15 (22.4%) leak plugins. Moreover, some
hotspots leak the MAC address to multiple third-parties, e.g., Pizza Hut to
11 domains, and H&M Place Montreal Trust and Discount Car Rental to six
third-parties each. Top organizations that receive the MAC addresses include:
Network-auth.com from 21 hotspots, Alphabet 18, Openh264.org 12, Facebook
10, Datavalet 8, and Amazon 6.
PII leaks via HTTP. We search for PII items of our used accounts in the
collected HTTP Wireshark traffic, and record the leaked information, including
the HTTP request URL, and source (captive portal vs. landing page). Three
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hotspots transmit the user’s full name via HTTP (Place Montreal Trust, Nau-
tilus Plus and Roots). In Place Montreal Trust, the user’s full name is saved in a
cookie (valid for five years), and each time the user connects to the captive por-
tal, the cookie is automatically transmitted via HTTP. Moreover, three hotspots
leak the user’s email address via HTTP (Dynamite, Roots, and Garage). In Nau-
tilus Plus, a user must enter her membership number in the captive portal. For
partially entered membership numbers, the captive portal verifies the identity
by displaying personal information of five people in a scrambled way (first and
last names, postal codes, ages, dates of birth, and phone numbers), over HTTP.
The user then chooses the right combination corresponding to her personal in-
formation. We also confirmed that some of this data belongs to real people by
authenticating to this hotspot using ten randomly generated partial member-
ship numbers. Then, we used the reverse lookup in canada411.ca to confirm
the correlation between the returned phone numbers, names, and addresses.
4.2 Presence of Third-Party Tracking Domains and HTTP Cookies
Tracking domains. We detect third-party tracking domains using: EasyList,
EasyPrivacy, and Fanboy’s List. On average, each captive portal hosts 7.4 third-
party tracking domains (max: 34 domains, including 10 known trackers); see
Fig. 2. We noticed that the hotspots that use the same third-party captive portal
still have a different number of third-parties. For example, for the Datavalet [9]
hotspots (YUL Airport, McDonald’s, Starbucks, Via Rail Station, Tim Hortons,
CIBC Bank, Place Vertu), the number of third-parties are 22, 16, 10, 8, 5, 5,
and 2 respectively. The hotspots (46; 68.7%) that redirect users to their cor-
porate websites, host more known third-party tracking domains—on average,
30.6 domains per landing page; see Fig. 3. We also analyzed the organizations
with the highest known-tracker representations. We group domains by the larger
parent company that owns these domains. Alphabet, Facebook, and Datavalet
are present on over 10% of the captive portals. Alphabet and Facebook are also
present on over 50% of the landing pages.
HTTP tracking cookies on captive portals. We found 40 (59.7%) hotspots
create third-party cookies valid for various duration—e.g., over 5 years from 10
(14.9%) hotspots, six months to five years from 23 (34.3%) hotspots, and under
six months from 38 (56.7%) hotspots; see Fig. 4. Via Rail Station, Fairview
Pointe-Claire, Carrefour Laval, Roots, McDonald’s, Tim Hortons, and Harvey’s
have a third-party cookie from network-auth.com, valid for 20 years. Moreover,
YUL Airport, Via Rail Station, Complexe Desjardins, McDonald’s, Starbucks,
Tim Hortons, CIBC Bank have a common 1-year valid cookie from Datavalet,
except for CIBC (17 days). This cookie uniquely identifies a device based on the
MAC address (set to the same value unless the MAC address is spoofed). Some
hotspots save the MAC address in HTTP cookies, including CHU Sainte-Justine,
Moose BAWR, and Centre Rockland.
We also analyze first-party cookies on captive portals; see Fig. 5. 22 (32.8%)
hotspots create first-party cookies valid for various durations; 14 (20.9%) hotspots
include cookies valid for periods ranging from six months to five years, and 17
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Fig. 2. Unique number of third-parties on captive portals (top 20). For example,
Hvmans Cafe hosts a total of 34 tracking domains, including 7 known trackers. Note
that for all reported tracking/domain statistics, we accumulate the distinct trackers as
observed in all the datasets collected for a given hotspot. For list of evaluated hotspots
see Table 5 in the appendix.
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Fig. 3. Unique number of third-parties on landing pages (top 20)
(25.4%) hotspots for less than 6 months. Place Montreal Trust saves the user’s
full name in a first-party cookie valid for five years; this cookie is transmitted
via HTTP. Finally, we analyzed hotspots that create persistent cookies before
explicit consent from the user, we found 26 (38.8%) hotspots create cookies that
are valid for periods varying from 30 minutes to a year, including Domino’s
Pizza, Fido, GAP, H&M, McDonald’s, Roots, Starbucks, and Tim Hortons.
HTTP tracking cookies on landing pages. We found 48 (71.6%) hotspots
create third-party cookies valid for various durations—e.g., over 5 years from 4
(6.0%) hotspots, six months to five years from 47 (70.1%) hotspots, and under six
months from 42 (62.7%) hotspots; see Fig. 9 in the appendix. Prominent exam-
ples include the following. Fossil has a 25-year valid cookie from pbbl.com; CIBC
Bank has two 5-year valid cookies from stackadapt.com, a known tracker. More-
over, H&M, Starbucks, Laura, Fido, Gap Canada, Harvey’s, and Ikea have multi-
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Fig. 4. Number of third-party cookies on captive portals (top 20). Note that for all
reported cookies/domain statistics, we accumulate the distinct cookies as observed in
all the datasets collected for a given hotspot.
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Fig. 5. Number of first-party cookies on captive portals (top 20)
ple ten-year valid first-party cookies, but their names suggest a relationship with
Optimizely [32]. Indeed, JavaScript from optimizely.com creates these cookies,
although Optimizely states that they do not create third-party cookies [33].
We also analyzed the first-party cookies on landing pages; see Fig. 10 in
the appendix. 41 (62.7%) hotspots create first-party cookies valid for various
durations—e.g., over 5 years from 10 (14.9%) hotspots, six months to five years
from 42 (62.7%) hotspots, and under six months from 41 (61.2%) hotspots. No-
table examples: Fossil has a 99-year valid cookie, Fido has three cookies valid
for 68–81 years, CHU Sainte-Justine has a 20-year valid cookie, CIBC Bank has
a 19-year cookie, and Walmart has four cookies valid for 9–20 years.
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Fig. 6. Unique number of fingerprinting APIs on captive portals (top 20). Note that
for all fingerprinting statistics, we accumulate the distinct APIs as observed in all the
datasets collected for a given hotspot.
4.3 Device and Browser Fingerprinting
We analyzed fingerprinting attempts in captive portals and landing pages. We
use Don’t FingerPrint Me (DFPM [22]) for detecting known fingerprinting tech-
niques, including the screen object, navigator object, WebRTC, Font, WebGL,
Canvas, AudioContext, and Battery Status [14,30,29,31]. We use attribute and
API interchangeably, when referring to fingerprinting JavaScript APIs.
Captive portal. 24 (35.8%) hotspots perform some form of fingerprinting. On
average, each captive portal uses 5.9 attributes (max: 47 attributes, including
35 Navigator, 6 Screen, 3 Canvas, and 3 Battery Status); see Fig. 6. We also
found 10 (14.9%) hotspots fingerprint user device/browser before explicit consent
from the user, including GAP, McDonald’s, and Place Montreal Trust, using 6–
46 fingerprinting attributes. Our manual analysis of the GAP scripts reveals
Font fingerprinting by checking the list of installed fonts using the side-channel
inference technique described by Nikiforakis et al. [30]. Moreover, 46 (68.7%)
captive portals fingerprint device MAC addresses.
Landing pages. 51 (76.1%) hotspots perform fingerprinting on their landing
pages. On average, each landing page fingerprints 19.4 attributes (max: 117 at-
tributes, including 49 Navigator, 9 Screen, 2 Canvas, 3 WebRTC, 50 WebGL, 1
AudioContext, 1 Worker and 2 Battery Status); see Fig. 7. Prominent examples
include the following. Discount Car Rental includes script from Sizmek Technolo-
gies Inc., which uses a total of 67 APIs (48 WebGL, 12 Navigator, five Screen,
and two Canvas APIs). Manual analysis also reveals Font fingerprinting via side-
channel inference [30]; this script is also highly similar to FingerprintJS [44].
Discount Car Rental also contains script from Integral Ad Science, which uses
41 attributes, including: 31 Navigator, seven Screen APIs, two WebRTC, and
one AudioContext (cf. [14]). The navigator APIs are used to collect attributes
such as the USB gamepad controllers using Navigator.getGamepads(), and list
MIDI input and output devices using navigator.requestMIDIAccess. H&M and
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Fig. 7. Unique number of fingerprinting APIs on landing pages (top 20)
Home Depot host the same JavaScript that collects 42 attributes, including 34
Navigator, six Screen, and two Canvas APIs. Laura has a script from PerimeterX
that collects 27 attributes, including 21 Navigator and 6 Screen APIs; manual
analysis of the source code reveals WebGL and Canvas fingerprinting.
5 CPInspector on Android
In contrast to Windows, Android OS handles captive portals with a dedicated
application. The Android Developers documentation and Android Source docu-
mentation omit details of how Android handles captive portals. Here we briefly
document the inner working of Android captive portals, and discuss our prelim-
inary findings, specifically on tracking cookies on Android devices.
Android captive portal login app. Using Android ps (Process Status), we
observe that a new process named com.android.captiveportallogin appears
whenever the captive portal is launched. The Manifest file for CaptivePortalLo-
gin explicitly defines that its activity class will receive all captive portal broad-
casts by any application installed on the OS and handle the captive portal. We
observe that files in the data folder of this application are populated and altered
during a captive portal session; we collect these files from our tests.
Capturing network traffic. To capture traffic from Android apps, several
readily-available VPN apps from Google Play can be used (e.g., Packet Cap-
ture, NetCapture, NetKeeper). However, Android does not use VPN for captive
portals. On the other hand, using an MITM Proxy server such as mitmproxy
(https://mitmproxy.org/) requires the server to run on a desktop environ-
ment, which would make the internet traffic come out of the desktop OS, i.e.,
the mobile device would not be visible to the hotspot. To overcome this, we set
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up a virtual Linux environment within the Android OS by using Linux Deploy
(https://github.com/meefik/linuxdeploy), enabling us to run Linux desk-
top applications within Android with access to the core component of Android
OS, e.g., Android OS processes, network interfaces, etc. We use Debian and
mitmproxy on the virtual environment, and configure Android’s network set-
tings to proxy all the traffic going through the WiFi adapter to the mitmproxy
server. The proxy provides us the shared session keys established with a destina-
tion server, enabling us to decrypt HTTPS traffic. We use tcpdump to capture
the network traffic.
Data collection and analysis. We visited 22 hotspots and collected network
traffic from their captive portals. First, we clear the data and cache of the Cap-
tivePortalLogin app and collect data from a given hotspot. Next, we change the
MAC address of our test devices (Google Pixel 3 with Android 9 and Nexus 4
with Android 5.1.1) and collect data again without clearing the data and cache.
From the proxy’s request packets, we confirm that the browser agent correctly
reflects our test devices, and the traffic is being originated from the CaptivePor-
talLogin app. Next, we analyze the data extracted from the app. The structure
of the data directory is similar to Google Chrome on Android. We locate the
.\app_webview\Cookies SQLite file in the data directory, storing the Captive-
PortalLogin app’s cookies.
We observe that 9 out of 22 hotspots store persistent cookies in the captive
portal app; see Fig. 8. These cookies are not erased when the portal app is closed,
or when the user leaves the hotspot. Instead, the cookies remain active as set
in their validity periods, although they are unavailable to the regular browser
apps. Prominent examples include: Tim Hortons inserts a 20-year valid cookie
from network-auth.com, and Hvmans Cafe stores a 10-year valid cookie from
Instagram. In the captive portal traffic, we confirm that these cookies are in-
deed present and shared in subsequent visits, and follow the Same-Origin Policy.
Hotspots can use these cookies to uniquely identify and authenticate user de-
vices even when the device MAC address is dynamically changed; Tim Hortons
hotspot uses its cookies for authentication. However, McDonald’s did not authen-
ticate the device even though the cookies were present but the MAC was new.
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6 Privacy Policy and Anti-Tracking
Privacy policy. We performed a preliminary manual analysis of privacy policy
and TOS documents from hotspots that appear to be most risky. Roots states
clearly in their privacy policy that they use SSL to protect PII, but their captive
portal transmits a user’s full name and email address via HTTP. Place Mon-
treal Trust transmits the user’s full name via HTTP, and they explicitly state
that transmission of information over the public networks cannot be guaranteed
to be 100% secure. Nautilus Plus has a very basic TOS that omits important
information such as the laws they comply with and privacy implications of us-
ing their hotspot. They state clearly that the assurance of confidentiality of the
user’s information is of great concern to Nautilus Plus, but they use HTTP for
all communications, leaking personal information while they attempt to verify
the customer’s identity. Their privacy policy is also inaccessible from the captive
portal and omits any reference to WiFi.
Dynamite and Garage are two brands of Groupe Dynamite. They transmit
the user’s email address via HTTP despite claiming to use SSL. Their privacy
policy is inaccessible from the captive portal and omits any reference to the WiFi.
GAP explicitly mentions their collection of browser/device information, and they
indeed collect 46 such attributes, before the user accepts the hotspot’s policies.
Although McDonald’s tracks users in their captive portal (9 known track-
ers, 28 fingerprinting attributes), the captive portal itself lacks a privacy policy
stating their use of web tracking. Carrefour Laval and Fairview Pointe-Claire
perform cross device tracking by participating in the Adobe Marketing Cloud
Co-op [2], where they may collect and share information about devices linked
to the user. Two hotspots link the users MAC address to the collected personal
information, including Roots, Bombay Mahal Thali.
Sharing the harvested data with subsidiaries and third-party affiliates is also
the norm. Eight hotspots (including Hvmans Cafe, Fairview Pointe-Claire, and
Carrefour Laval) state that PII may be stored outside Canada. Ten hotspots
omit any information about the PII storage location, including Dominos’s Pizza
and Roots. However, five hotspots have their captive portal domain in the US,
including Bombay Mahal Thali, Carrefour Angrignon, Domino’s Pizza, Grevin
Montreal, and Roots. Three hotspots lack any privacy policy or a TOS document
on their captive portals, including Laura, ECCO, and Maison Simmons.
Chrome vs. Firefox. On captive portals, we found that the number of third-
party tracking domains between Chrome and Firefox browsers differs by 5.3%
(Chrome: 353, including 79 known trackers; Firefox: 373, including 81 known
trackers). On landing pages, the difference is 7.7% (Chrome: 2021, including
1317 known trackers; Firefox: 1865, including 1201 known trackers). Note that,
landing pages generally host more dynamic content compared to captive por-
tal pages; also, the Discount Car Rental hotspot lands on msn.com on Chrome
and lands on the user’s last visited page on Firefox. Moreover, due to various
runtime errors, we could not test some hotspots in Firefox, including Carrefour
Angrignon, Centre Rockland, Mail Champlain, and Centre Eaton.
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The same hotspot captive portal in different locations. 12 hotspots are
measured at multiple physical locations. We stopped collecting datasets from dif-
ferent locations of the same chain-business as the collected datasets were largely
the same. We provide an example where some minor differences occur: Starbucks’
captive portal domain varies in the two evaluated locations (am.datavalet.io
vs. sbux-j2.datavalet.io). However, the number of known trackers remained
the same, while the number of third-parties increased by one domain. More-
over, the --sf-device cookie validity increased from 17 days to 1 year, and the
--sf-landing cookie was not created in the second location.
Effectiveness of privacy extensions and private browsing. To evaluate
the effectiveness anti-tracking solutions against hotspot trackers, we collected
traffic from both Chrome and Firefox in private browsing modes, and by enabling
Adblock Plus [15] and Privacy Badger [12] extensions—leading to a total of six
datasets for each hotspot. Then, we use the EasyList, EasyPrivacy, and Fanboy’s
lists to determine whether blacklisted requests or tracking cookies remain in the
collected datasets; see Table 2. We only count the domain name of a tracker or
advertiser when a request was sent, or a cookie was created.
Table 2. The number of unique domains not blocked by our anti-tracking solutions.
Ad Block Plus Privacy Badger Private Browsing
Firefox 33 180 315
Chrome 117 212 356
Hotspot trackers in the wild. We measured the prevalence of trackers found
in captive portals and landing pages, in popular websites—to understand the
reach and consequences of hotspot trackers. We use OpenWPM [14] between Feb.
28–Mar. 15, 2019 to automatically browse the home pages of the top 143k Tranco
domains [26] as of Feb. 27, 2019. We extracted the tracking persistent (validity
≥ 1 day; cf. [5]) cookie domains from captive portals or landing pages. Then,
we counted those tracking domains in the OpenWPM database; see Table 8 in
the appendix. For example, the doubleclick.net cookie as found in 4 captive
portals and 30 landing pages, appears 160,508 times in the top 143k Tranco
domains (mutiple times in some domains). Overall, hotspot users can be tracked
across websites, even long time after the user has left a hotspot.
7 Conclusion
Many people across the world use public WiFi offered by an increasing number of
businesses and public/government services. The use of VPNs, and the adoption of
HTTPS in most websites and mobile apps largely secure users’ personal/financial
data from a malicious hotspot provider and other users of the same hotspot.
However, device/user tracking as enabled by hotspots due to their access to
MAC address and PII, remains as a significant privacy threat, which has not been
explored thus far. Our analysis shows clear evidence of privacy risks and calls
for more thorough scrutiny of these public hotspots by e.g., privacy advocates
and government regulators. We will release our framework for easy replication
and measurement in other parts of the world.
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Appendix
Table 3. Sample of variations of the same third-party domain.
Third-Party Request-URL Blacklisted
https://www.google-analytics.com/r/collect?v=& v=&a=&t=& s=1&dl=&ul=&de=&dt=
&sd=&sr=&vp=&je=& u=&jid=&gjid=&cid=&tid=& gid=& r=1&gtm=&cd1= &cd64= &cd65= &did= &z=
Yes
https://www.google-analytics.com/j/collect?v=& v=&a=&t=& s=&dl=&ul=&de=&dt=&sd=24-
bit&sr=&vp=&je=& u= &jid= &gjid=&cid=&tid=& gid=& r=&cd1=&cd5=&cd6=&cd8=&cd9=&z=
No
Table 4. Count of tracking domains from captive portals and landing pages in Alexa
143k home pages (top 10).
Captive Portal Landing Page
Tracker Count Tracker Count
doubleclick.net 160508 pubmatic.com 326991
linkedin.com 48726 rubiconproject.com 257643
facebook.com 37107 doubleclick.net 160508
twitter.com 14874 casalemedia.com 131626
google.com 13676 adsrvr.org 116438
atdmt.com 5198 addthis.com 83221
instagram.com 3466 demdex.net 83160
gap.com 295 contextweb.com 82965
maxmind.com 294 rlcdn.com 75295
gapcanada.ca 64 livechatinc.com 69919
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Fig. 9. Number of third-party cookies on landing pages (top 20)
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Fig. 10. Number of first-party cookies on landing pages (top 20)
Table 5. List of evaluated hotspots
Category Count Hotspot Name
Cafe and Restaurant 19 A&W, Bombay Mahal Thali, Burger King,
Cafe Osmo, Copper Branch, Domino’s Pizza,
Harvey’s, Hvmans Cafe, Juliette Et Chocolat,
Mcdonalds, Moose BAWR, Nespresso, Pizza Hut,
Pizza Pizza, Starbucks, Sushi STE-Catherine,
The Second Cup, Tim Hortons, Vua Sandwiches
Retail business 17 Canadian Tire, Dynamite, ECCO, Fossil, GAP,
Garage, H&M, Home Depot, IGA, Ikea, Laura,
Maison Simmons, Michael Kors, Roots, SAQ,
Sephora, Walmart
Shopping Mall 12 Atrium 1000, Carrefour Angrignon, Carrefour Laval,
Carrefour iA, Centre Eaton, Centre Rockland,
Complexe Desjardins, Fairview Pointe-Claire,
Mail Champlain, Place Montreal Trust, Place Vertu,
Place Ville Marie
Bank 5 CIBC Bank, Desjardins 360, RBC Bank, ScotiaBank,
TD Bank
Art and Entertainment 4 Grevin Montreal, YMCA, Montreal Science Centre,
Place Des Arts
Transportation 3 Gare d’Autocars de Montreal, Via Rail Station,
YUL Airport
Telecom Kiosk 2 Fido, Telus
Car Rental 1 Discount Car Rental
Gymnasium 1 Nautilus Plus
Hospital 1 CHU Sainte-Justine
Hotel 1 Fairmont Hotel
Library 1 Westmount Public Library
